Abstract. In secure multi-party computation, a reactive functionality is one which maintains persistent state, takes inputs, and gives outputs over many rounds of interaction with its parties. Reactive functionalities are fundamental and model many interesting and natural cryptographic tasks; yet their security properties are not nearly as well-understood as in the non-reactive case (known as secure function evaluation). We present new combinatorial characterizations for 2-party reactive functionalities, which we model as finite automata. We characterize the functionalities that have passive-secure protocols, and those which are complete with respect to passive adversaries. Both characterizations are in the information-theoretic setting.
Introduction
Ever since Yao [17] introduced the concept of secure multi-party computation (SMPC) with his famous Millionaire's Problem, the majority of research in the area has focused on understanding secure function evaluation (SFE) tasks. In an SFE task, all parties provide inputs and then receive outputs according to a (typically) deterministic function, in a single round of interaction with the functionality. The functionality that carries out this task has no need for persistent memory -it simply receives inputs from the parties, computes outputs, and thereafter forgets everything.
Yet, SMPC security models (e.g., [2] ) allow for functionalities that maintain internal state across many rounds of interaction. We call such functionalities reactive. The most well-known example of an inherently reactive functionality is bit-commitment, the cryptographic equivalent of a locked box.
In a secure protocol, the parties must achieve the same effect as the functionality. Reactivity introduces new and unique challenges; in particular, there is a tension between the fact that the parties may individually have a great deal of uncertainty about the functionality's internal state, and the fact that the parties collectively must be able to maintain its internal state in order to correctly simulate its behavior.
To understand reactive functionalities is, therefore, to understand how persistent information can be maintained, updated, kept secret, and computed upon.
What's more, from a practical perspective, reactive tasks are fundamentalany task involving time-sensitive release of information or the ability for parties to adapt to new information learned from an interaction must be necessarily reactive.
Background & Related Work. The first security model for which SFE tasks were understood is the model of passive security against computationally unbounded adversaries. Beaver [1] & Kushilevitz [12] independently characterized secure realizability for 2-party SFE tasks in this model. These results characterized which functionalities have perfectly secure protocols; the same characterization was later extended to the case where negligible security error is allowed [13, 11] . We strongly leverage this characterization in our own result for the reactive case.
A functionality F is said to be complete (with respect to some security notion for protocols) if every functionality has a secure protocol in which the parties are allowed to make use of ideal instances of F. Kilian [6] was the first to characterize completeness for 2-party SFE functionalities. The result was later generalized to functionalities with possibly different outputs to the two parties [9] . As before, we strongly leverage the well-known characterization for the SFE case in our own result for the reactive case.
These characterizations, and many others for SFE tasks (e.g., [4, 7, 8] ) are exclusively combinatorial in nature. Each SFE is associated with its 2-dimensional input/output table and then classified based on whether this table has a certain structure -say, a forbidden kind of 2 × 2 submatrix.
In some security settings, there exist secure protocols for every SFE functionality (e.g., standalone security in the computationally bounded setting); it is not hard to see that this also implies secure protocols for all reactive functionalities as well. However, hardness (infeasibility) results for reactive functionalities are much rarer in the literature. Some fundamental reactive functionalities like bit commitment have been studied in an ad hoc fashion [3] . To the best of our knowledge, large classes of reactive functionalities have been considered only in [15, 14, 16] . Of these, only one result of Maji, Prabhakaran, and Rosulek [14] involves a combinatorial (decidable) characterization. They characterize the 2-party reactive functionalities which have UC-secure protocols without any setup (the characterization is the same for both the computationally bounded and unbounded settings). They model functionalities as deterministic, finite-state transducers; our work uses the same automata model of reactive functionalities. We note that, while the SMPC paradigm allows one to consider reactive functionalities that cannot be represented as such finite automata, many important and natural functionalities can indeed be modeled in this way (e.g., bit commitment).
Our Results
We derive combinatorial characterizations for the cryptographic properties of 2-party reactive functionalities. In particular, we characterize triviality (i.e., feasibility) and completeness with respect to computationally unbounded, passive (a.k.a. semi-honest, or honest-but-curious) adversaries. Ours is the first work to classify properties of reactive functionalities in this fundamental setting. Following [14] , we model reactive functionalities as finite automata.
For a reactive functionality F, define a related non-reactive functionality F (k)
which takes a length-k sequence of inputs from each of Alice and Bob, then runs F for k rounds on these inputs and gives each party their corresponding length-k sequence of outputs. It is not difficult to see that:
-F is passive-trivial if and only if for all k ∈ N, F (k) is passive-trivial. -F is passive-complete if and only if F (k) is passive-complete for some k ∈ N.
In this way it is possible to reduce the characterizations for reactive functionalities to the corresponding well-known ones for SFE functionalities. However, the above characterizations are of limited use. Both conditions are infinitary in nature (requiring either the universe of all protocols to be enumerated, or an infinite number of values k to be checked). Our technical contribution is in our analyses showing that only a finite number of values k need to be checked. We obtain characterizations of the following form:
Main Theorem. Let F be a reactive 2-party functionality. There exist constants K t and K c , which depend only on the number of states in F, such that:
1. F is passive-trivial if and only if for all k ≤ K t , F (k) is passive-trivial; and 2. F is passive-complete if and only if F (k) is passive-complete for some k ≤ K c .
Thus we obtain total decision procedures for determining triviality and completeness of reactive functionalities. The characterizations for SFE are combinatorial in nature, and thus ours also inherit that flavor. Also, the statement of the main theorem is valid even if protocols are allowed a negligible error (though the final characterization for passive-triviality is the same whether zero error or negligible error is required).
The bulk of our effort is devoted to proving the existence of the constant K t above. The main technical challenge when dealing with reactive functionalities is accounting for the uncertainty both parties have about the (hidden) internal state of the functionality. For example, even if the behavior of the functionality is benign in every state, it may still be possible to elicit non-trivial behavior from the functionality when both parties have uncertainty about its internal state. To justify our somewhat complicated analysis, we show that simply inspecting the local behavior of each state does not suffice to characterize the security properties of reactive functionalities.
To properly deal with the complications of a functionality's hidden internal state, we develop a "normal form" for functionalities that explicitly captures the common knowledge both parties have about the internal state. The final characterization follows then by the requirements imposed by this normal form.
Our characterizations are for functionalities that give possibly different outputs to each party. Using the normal form described above, we show that, unless a functionality is passive-complete, it is isomorphic to one with symmetric output. This generalizes an analogous result of [9] for non-reactive functionalities.
A probability p(n) is negligible if for all c > 0, p(n) < n −c for all but finitely many n. We use bold symbols (e.g., x, y) to denote sequences over some finite alphabet (e.g., X or Y ). We write |x| to denote the length of a sequence, and we use to denote concatenation of sequences (e.g., x x). When T is a 2-dimensional table, and a and b are appropriate indices, we use the notation T [a, b] to denote the entry of T in row a, column b.
Passive Security
We use the standard real-ideal paradigm [5] to define protocol security. We exclusively consider security against passive (a.k.a. honest-but-curious, or semihonest) and computationally unbounded adversaries, and we call protocols which achieve this standard passive-secure for short. We say that a protocol uses the functionality G if the parties are instructed to interact with ideal instances of the functionality G (i.e., the protocol is in the "G-hybrid model").
We say that a functionality F is passive-trivial if there is a passive-secure protocol for F without any setups. We say that F is passive-complete if there is a passive-secure oblivious-transfer protocol that uses access to ideal instances of F. In this work, we consider the information-theoretic setting exclusively, so adversaries are computationally unbounded. Unlike the first characterizations for SFE functionalities [1, 12] , we do not restrict our attention to protocols that achieve perfect security. Instead, we use the now-standard notion of passive security, which permits protocols to have a negligible simulation error.
Isomorphism. We call a protocol for F using G a local protocol if it uses just one instance of G to realize an instance of F, does not use communication between the parties other than G, and each round of outputs for F is realized in the protocol by the parties making a single call to G. Then call two functionalities F and G isomorphic if there is a local, passive-secure protocol for F using G and vice-versa.
Notation and Characterizations for SFE
We briefly review known characterizations for passive-triviality and passivecompleteness of SFE functionalities. We state the characterizations in terms of new notation, which cleanly unifies the cases of symmetric and non-symmetric output for the two parties. The terminology defined here is used throughout the work.
A 2-party SFE F is specified by finite sets X and Y , and two deterministic functions
We use these default variable names throughout this work. As a cryptographic functionality, Alice and Bob provide inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y to F, respectively, and receive outputs f A (x, y) and f B (x, y), respectively.
We say that F is basic onX ×Ỹ if: for all y ∈Ỹ , f B is a constant function oñ X × {y}, and for all x ∈X, f A is a constant function on {x} ×Ỹ . Basic functions require no interaction to evaluate (a party's input has no influence on the other's output). Finally, an or-minor in F is a tuple (x, x , y, y ) ∈ X 2 × Y 2 with:
Passive-Completeness. or-minors exactly characterize passive-completeness for SFE functionalities:
). The following are equivalent for a 2-party SFE F:
1. F is passive-complete. 2. F has an or-minor.
3. There exist inputs x, y such that F is not basic on rectangle(F, x, y).
Proof. The equivalence of 1 & 2 was shown by Kraschewski & Müller-Quade [9] , generalizing the analogous statement for symmetric-output functions by Kilian [6] . The equivalence of 2 & 3 follows straightforwardly from the definitions of or-minor and rectangle(F, x, y).
The following useful lemma was also proven in [9] :
Lemma 2 (Symmetrization [9] ). Given an SFE F, define the (symmetric) SFE functionality F sym , which on input x from Alice and y from Bob gives both parties output rectangle(F, x, y). If F has no or-minor, then F is isomorphic to F sym .
Passive-Triviality. Passive-triviality for SFE functionalities is characterized by a combinatorial condition called decomposability.
Definition 1 ( [1, 12] ). An SFE F is decomposable if one of the following holds:
1. F is basic (defined above); or, 2. There is a partition X =X 1 ∪X 2 so that for all
There is a partition Y =Ỹ 1 ∪Ỹ 2 so that for all x ∈ X, y 1 ∈Ỹ 1 , and
, and furthermore restrict(F, X ×Ỹ 1 ) and restrict(F, X ×Ỹ 2 ) are decomposable.
Lemma 3 ([13, 11]). F is passive-trivial if and only if it is decomposable.
This lemma was originally proved for the case of perfectly secure protocols by Beaver [1] & Kushilevitz [12] (independently); later it was extended for the standard notion of security (allowing negligible error) by Maji, Prabhakaran & Rosulek [13] and Künzler, Müller-Quade & Raub [11] (independently).
Model of Reactive Functionalities
We use the model of reactive functionalities from [14] :
-Q is a finite set of states, -X and Y are finite input sets,
* are two output functions, and -q 0 ∈ Q is the start state.
The behavior of F as an ideal functionality is defined formally in Figure 1 .
4 As before, we use these standard variable names throughout.
Set variable q := q0. Then repeatedly do:
-Wait for input x ∈ X from Alice and input y ∈ Y from Bob. Give outputs fA(q, x, y) to Alice and fB(q, x, y) to Bob. Update q := δ(q, x, y) and repeat. We extend the functions δ, f A , and f B to sequences of inputs in the natural way. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ X k and y = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈ Y k . We write δ(q, x, y) to denote the state of F after receiving inputs (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x k , y k ) starting in state q. We write f A (q, x, y) to denote the concatenation of Alice's k outputs when F receives inputs (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x k , y k ) starting in state q. We write F (k) to denote the SFE functionality which on input (x, y) with |x| = |y| = k, gives output f A (q 0 , x, y) to Alice and f B (q 0 , x, y) to Bob. Then we have the following simple observations: Proposition 1 Let F be a DFF, and F (k) defined above.
1. For all k, there is a passive-secure protocol for F (k) using F. 2. There is a passive-secure protocol for F using {F (k) } k∈N .
Hence:
3. F is passive-trivial if and only if, for all k, F (k) is passive-trivial. 4. F is passive-complete if and only if F (k) is passive-complete for some k.
The secure protocol for F using (the infinite set of functionalities) {F (k) } requires both parties to maintain their history of inputs x and y. In the (k + 1)th round with histories x and y and new inputs x and y, both parties call F (k+1) with inputs x x and y y. When classifying a DFF for its cryptographic properties, one is tempted to examine the behaviors of each state, in isolation, for certain properties. We call such a test local, and in this section we describe the limitations of such local tests.
One way that local tests fail stems from the fact that local information is not enough to determine even whether two states have identical behavior. Given that, suppose some state has a transition function that contains an or-minor involving states q, q . How this or-minor affects the triviality/completeness of the functionality depends crucially on whether q and q have identical behavior. Still, we will show that, even when redundant states have been removed, local tests are insufficient to classify the cryptographic properties of DFFs.
We say that two states q and q are redundant in F if for all x, y with |x| = |y| we have f A (q, x, y) = f A (q , x, y) and f B (q, x, y) = f B (q , x, y). Redundant states can easily be collapsed in F using the classical Myhill-Nerode DFA minimization algorithm. Throughout this work we will generally assume without loss of generality that redundant states have been collapsed. Non-redundant state pairs (q, q ) have a distinguishing sequence (x, y) satisfying
Local tests can give an indication of the complexity of some DFFs, but cannot give a complete characterization. We consider local tests which inspect the output and transition functions of each state. To formalize this, we define for a DFF F a related DFF F st to be a modification to F which always announces its internal state to both parties. Then the output function of state q in F st contains all the relevant information about both the output and transition functions of q in F.
Lemma 4. Let F be a DFF that contains no redundant states. Proof. For items (1) and (2), we can assume without loss of generality that it is the start state of F that has the offending transition/output functions. More formally, let F[q] denote F with its start state changed to q. If q is reachable in F-say, via sequence (x, y) -then a passive-secure protocol for F[q] using F is to have both parties send an initial "preamble" of (x, y) to F and then proceed with the dummy protocol.
For items (1) and (2), if it is an output function in F (i.e., not in F st ) that is non-decomposable (resp. contains an or-minor), then the claim follows much more easily. There is a natural passive-secure protocol using F that realizes the start state's (SFE) output function -the parties simply interact with F for one round. The claims then follow from the complete characterizations for passivetriviality and passive-completeness of SFE (see Section 2.2).
(1) We fall into the case described above unless the start state's output function is decomposable. So, let G = (g A , g B ) denote the SFE which evaluates the first round only of F st and LetX ×Ỹ denote minimal subsets such that restrict(G,X ×Ỹ ) is not decomposable.
Next we show that the output function of the start state in F (not F st ) is basic onX ×Ỹ . If not, then since it is decomposable, it induces either a corresponding row-or column-decomposition step in G (which includes the F-output as well as the state). This splitsX ×Ỹ into at least two smaller subdomains, which by the minimality condition are decomposable. Thus G is decomposable onX ×Ỹ , which we have assumed to be false. By this contradiction, we see that the output function of F's start state must be basic onX ×Ỹ .
Let q, q be two distinct states reachable from the start state by single transitions on (x, y) ∈X ×Ỹ . As these states are non-redundant, let (x, y) be a distinguishing sequence for them, with |x| = |y| = k. Now consider the SFE functionality H = (h A , h B ) which on input (x, y) ∈X ×Ỹ gives output f A (q 0 , x x, y y) to Alice and f B (q 0 , x x, y y) to Bob. There is a passive-secure protocol for H using F (H is a submatrix of F (k+1) ). By Lemma 3 it suffices to show that H is not decomposable.
We have that rectangle(G, x, y) ⊆ rectangle(H, x, y), since the first round of F gives basic output for inputs inX ×Ỹ . Also, by our choice of x, y as a distinguishing sequence we have that H itself is not basic. Consider any partition ofX, say,X =X 0 ∪X 1 . Since G is minimal and not decomposable, there exists x 0 ∈X 0 , x 1 ∈X 1 , y ∈Ỹ such that g B (x 0 , y) = g B (x 1 , y). Hence, h B (x 0 , y) = h B (x 1 , y) soX =X 0 ∪X 1 does not satisfy the requirement for decomposability of H. Symmetrically, no partition ofỸ satisfies the requirement; hence H is not decomposable, as desired.
(2) Let (x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ) be the inputs of the relevant or-minor in the start state of F st ; as above, we may assume that the output function of q 0 in F is basic over {x 0 , x 1 } × {y 0 , y 1 }. Hence, the or-minor occurs entirely in the transition function of F; i.e., δ(q 0 , x i , y j ) = r i∨j for some states r 0 = r 1 . Let (x, y) be a distinguishing sequence for r 0 , r 1 , with |x| = |y| = k. Then it is straight-forward to verify that (x 0 x, x 1 x, y 0 y, y 1 y) is an or-minor in F (k+1) . Note that we crucially use the fact that the output of F is basic in the first round for the chosen input sequences.
(3) Let G be an arbitrary symmetric SFE functionality to be chosen later, and define F to do the following: In the first round, F gives constant output (regardless of the input) and remembers Alice's input x in its states, ignoring Bob's input. In the second round, F gives constant output and transitions to state r F (x,y) , where y is the input of Bob in the second round (Alice's input in this round is ignored). Here, states {r i } i are a set of states distinct from those used to implement rounds 1 & 2. Finally, in state r i , F gives constant output i and self-loops.
Note that the transition functions of F are all decomposable (in particular, at each round the transitions depend on at most one party's input), as are the output functions (they are constant functions in each state). A passive-secure protocol for G can be obtained from F, and vice-versa, in the natural way. Thus, F and G have the same status (e.g., trivial, complete, neither). We complete the proof by taking G to be an appropriate passive-trivial, passive-complete, or intermediate SFE.
Characterizing Completeness
Theorem 2. Let F be a DFF with n states. Then F is passive-complete if and only if there exists k ≤ n 4 such that F (k) contains an or-minor.
Proof. The "⇐" direction follows trivially from Proposition 1 and the characterization of completeness for SFE functionalities based on or-minors [6, 9] . For the other direction, let π be a passive-secure protocol for 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) using F. For sake of contradiction, suppose that for every k, F (k) has no or-minor. Following Proposition 1, we can without loss of generality modify π to obtain a passive-secure OT protocol using the collection of SFE functions{F (k) } k . Consider an execution of the protocol in which input bits a 0 , a 1 for Alice and b for Bob are chosen uniformly (i.e., Bob should learn a b and Alice should learn nothing). Let V denote the messages exchanged in the protocol along with the list of rectangle(F (k) , x, y) values for every time F (k) is invoked with inputs (x, y) in the protocol. Define P s,t = Pr[a s = t | V ] for s, t ∈ {0, 1}. Importantly, since no F (k) contains an or-minor, both parties can compute V (Lemma 2), and hence the P s,t values.
Suppose Bob guesses Alice's input a s to be the value t that maximizes P s,t . By a straight-forward argument, this guess will be correct with probability P s,t . Hence, by the security of the protocol, P 1−b,0 and P 1−b,1 must be close to 1/2 with high probability (recall that b is Bob's choice bit). However, by the correctness of the protocol we must also have P b,a b close to one and P b,1−a b close to zero with high probability as well. 6 Since Alice can also compute these P s,t values, this gives her a way to determine Bob's choice bit b with high probability (i.e., guess the value b such that P b,a b is maximized). Hence, we contradict the passive-security of the protocol, as desired. We note that this part of the proof is essentially the same as Kilian's proof for the case of SFE functionalities [6] . 6 The correctness of the protocol implies that Bob's entire view determines a b with high probability, whereas Ps,t is computed using less information than Bob's view. In particular, V does not include Bob's inputs to the ideal functionality. However, every input for Bob from rectangle(F (k) , x, y) would have had exactly the same effect on the interaction, in the absence of an or-minor. In other words, an honest Bob only needs to remember his input with as much specificity as rectangle(F (k) , x, y).
So far we have shown only that some F (k) must have an or-minor. Fix k to be minimal value such that F (k) contains an or-minor. If k ≤ n 4 then we are done. Otherwise, let d(x, y, i) denote the internal state of F after the first i rounds when the input sequence is (x, y),
Let (x, x , y, y ) be the or-minor of F (k) . By the pigeonhole principle (since k > n 4 ) there are distinct indices i, j ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that D(x, y, x , y , i) = D(x, y, x , y , j). Then removing positions i through j − 1 in the input sequences x, y, x , y yields an or-minor in F (k−j+i) . But this contradicts the minimality of k, so we must have originally had k ≤ n 4 .
Characterizing Passive Triviality

Overview
Our approach is to reduce our characterization of DFFs as much as possible to the known characterizations for SFE (given in Section 2.2). For intuition, suppose Alice & Bob have performed k rounds with F, giving input sequences x and y, respectively. When the functionality is passive-trivial, both parties can agree on
Their uncertainty about the current state of F is then captured by restrict(
is the extended transition function δ (k) (x, y) = δ(q 0 , x, y). Intuitively, both parties can maintain the 2-dimensional table C = restrict(δ (k) , rectangle(F (k) , x, y)), along with their respective inputs x and y to this table. Furthermore, these three pieces of information (x, y, and C) are enough to determine all future behavior of F. One could imagine a "canonical" protocol for F in which parties maintain such information (Alice maintaining x and C; Bob maintaining y and C).
With this as our starting point, we argue the following. First, duplicate rows & columns within C can be canonically removed. Second, the table C is a submatrix of δ (k) ; as such, it can contain no or-minor when F is passive-trivial. Finally, we prove a purely combinatorial lemma stating that any table that avoids duplicate rows, duplicate columns, and or-minors must be bounded in its dimensions (the bound is a function of the number of allowed values in the cells of the table). Hence, when F is trivial, the table C described above has an a priori, finite bound in size.
Our combinatorial lemma reveals some structure of functions which avoid or-minors. In that sense, our lemma is reminiscent of similar lemmas used in [4] and [10] , for the n-party setting.
We prove our characterization by converting F into an equivalent "normal form" F, which simulates F by keeping track of the information (x, y, and C) described above. In each state of F, we use the internal state variable C to associate a related submatrix of F (k) for some k. We then show that F is passivetrivial if and only if each of these submatrices of {F (k) } k is itself passive-trivial.
Importantly, there can be only a finite number of states -hence, a finite number of F (k) submatrices -to inspect when deciding whether F is passive-trivial. We highlight one important subtlety in the construction of F. Our combinatorial lemma shows that the table C has bounded size, but we are also associating its rows & columns with F-input sequences of length k. Thus, while the table itself has bounded size, conceivably the row-and column-"labels" become unbounded in length. Our construction of F implicitly shows that these row-and column-labels are not used meaningfully; that is, they can be renormalized to simply be numerical indices into the table. Hence, the entire state-space of F (which contains this table C as well as two labels indexing into the table) is indeed finite.
Combinatorial Lemma
Definition 3 (Grid colorings and their properties). A k-coloring of an m × n grid is a function C : {1, . . . , m} × {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , k}. A row i is a duplicate row if C(i, ·) ≡ C(i , ·) for some i = i. Duplicate columns are defined analogously. A tuple (i, i , j, j ) forms an or-minor in C if
We will use the following lemma, which states that sufficiently large grid colorings cannot avoid duplicate rows, duplicate columns, and or-minors.
Lemma 5 (Unavoidable structures of grid colorings).
There is a function R : N → N satisfying the following property. For every k-coloring C of an m × n grid, if max{m, n} ≥ R(k), then C contains either a duplicate row, duplicate column, or an or-minor.
Proof. We prove the lemma for the bound R(2) = 3; R(k) = k · R(k − 1). Thus R(k) = Θ(k!). In fact, we prove the two stronger statements that (1) if m ≥ R(k) then C contains either a duplicate row or an or-minor; (2) if n ≥ R(k) then C contains either a duplicate column or an or-minor. The two proofs are symmetric and we give the proof of (1) here. The case of R(2) = 3 can be verified by exhaustion.
For the inductive case, consider a k-coloring C with more than R(k) rows. We assume that C has no or-minors, and will show that there must be a duplicate row. By the pigeonhole principle, there must be some color (by symmetry, color #k) which appears more than R(k)/k = R(k − 1) times in the first column. The properties we seek are invariant under permuting rows and columns, so permute the rows and columns so that the north-west corner is colored #k, and the instances of color #k in the first row and first column are contiguous.
Since C contains no or-minor, we have that C can be partitioned into four quadrants, NW, NE, SE, SW:
where NW has more than R(k −1) rows, NW contains only color #k, and NE and SW contain only colors {1, . . . , k − 1}. Thus, NE is a (k − 1)-coloring with more than R(k − 1) rows and no or-minors. As such it contains duplicate rows. When augmented to the left with identical sequences of k's, we obtain corresponding duplicate rows in C, as desired.
We proved the existence of such an R with R(k) = Θ(k!), which suffices for our purposes but which may or may not be optimal. We can obtain a lower bound of 2 k−1 on the optimal value of R(k), by considering the following recursivelydefined k-colorings of a 2 k−1 × 2 k−1 grid:
Here U k denotes the 2 k−2 × 2 k−2 grid filled uniformly with color k. The colorings {C k } k avoid duplicate rows, duplicate columns, and or-minors. We conjecture that R(k) = 2 k−1 is the optimal value for R as in the lemma statement.
Normal Form
Let T be a 2-dimensional table with We define trim(i, j, T ) for (i, j) ∈ A × B to denote a tuple (i , j , T ), where:
1. T is a table with row-labels A = {1, . . . , m} and column-labels B = {1, . . . , n}. By item (1) we see that T has no duplicate columns or rows. Essentially, trim removes duplicate rows/columns and re-normalizes the row/column labels. Furthermore, the mapping i → i does not depend on j, the mapping j → j does not depend on i, and the mapping T → T does not depend on i or j. 
